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I. INTRODUCTION
As increasing numbers of immigrants who speak a variety
of languages enter the work force across the United States,
some employers have attempted to force their employees to
speak English on the job.' These employers argue that English-
only policies are necessary to keep the workplace from becoming
a "Tower of Babel" in which safety, productivity, and worker
harmony suffer.2 In response, employees have challenged the
English-only rules under federal employment discrimination
laws on the grounds that the rules constitute national origin
discrimination. These employees concede that English-only pol-
icies may be applied to all employees without animosity on the
employer's part toward any national origin group. However,
they contend that such policies disparately impact employees of
non-Anglo origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.1
* B.A. 1976, Sonoma State University; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Puget
Sound School of Law.
1. David Foster, English-Only Policies: Preventing 'Tower of Babel' or Aiding
Racism?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at B3.
2. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Congress enacted the major provisions of
federal equal employment law in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L, No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The section
prohibiting discriminatory employment practices states as follows:
Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,4 the Ninth Circuit identified
the evidentiary burden that employees challenging English-
only workplace policies must meet to make a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination under Title VII. The Ninth
Circuit panel held that employees challenging English-only
rules cannot establish a violation of Title VII through mere
assertions that the rule has caused them harm.5 Rather, the
plaintiffs must actually show that the application of the Eng-
lish-only policy has a significant adverse effect on the working
conditions of the plaintiffs that is not felt to the same degree by
the employee population as a whole.6
This holding explicitly rejects an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guideline, under which Eng-
lish-only rules are per se discriminatory. 7 The decision allo-
cates the burdens of production and proof in accordance with
Congressional intent and with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of Title VII, and fairly balances employees' need for protec-
tion from employment practices that are "built-in headwinds"
against protected employees with employers' need to manage
today's culturally diverse work force without fear of unwar-
ranted litigation.
The Spun Steak court correctly resisted the temptation to
expand Title VII's reach beyond that intended by Congress,
holding that the statute does not protect an employee's right to
cultural expression through the language of the employee's
national origin. The court retained a cause of action for those
employees who do not speak English fluently and who can
establish that English-only rules deny them the right to con-
verse on the job. The court also reaffirmed the right of employ-
ees to maintain a Title VII action when English-only rules are
harshly applied or create a hostile environment.' By limiting
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
4. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 1486.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1489.
8. Id. at 1488-89.
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the group of potential plaintiffs to those actually harmed by the
policy, the decision wisely allows employers discretion to man-
age the inevitable problems that arise in a multilingual work
force without having their decisions subject to unnecessary judi-
cial scrutiny. Although the decision recognizes that English-
only rules may impact Title VII in some circumstances, the
court held that an employer's good-faith imposition of these
rules on fully bilingual employees does not violate Title VII.
Section II of this Comment presents an overview of the sub-
stantive law and the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII. Sec-
tion III outlines the development of federal discrimination law
regarding English-only rules. Section IV examines the Spun
Steak decision, and Section V analyzes the implications of this
decision and its effect on discrimination law in the Ninth
Circuit.
II. TITLE VII: THE LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
The text of Title VII specifies certain groups, or protected
classes, who may claim relief under Title VII.9 Title VII prohib-
its discrimination by private employers, 10 labor organizations,1
and employment agencies12 with respect to hiring, promotion,
and terms of employment.' 3 The imposition of burdensome
terms and conditions of employment on a protected class is also
prohibited. 14
A. Filing a Charge with the EEOC
Title VII requires aggrieved employees to seek mediation
and conciliation of their charge through the EEOC or a quali-
fied state agency before bringing court action against the
9. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of only five classifications: race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
10. Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person." Id. § 2000e(b). The federal government, Indian tribes, and bona fide
membership clubs are specifically excluded from this definition, and other entities are
partially excluded. Id. Coverage now extends to U.S. employers operating in foreign
countries. Id. § 2000e(f) (Supp. III 1991).
11. Id. § 2000e-2(c), (d) (1988).
12. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
13. Id. § 20O0e-2(a)-(d).
14. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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employer.'" The EEOC investigates the complaint and either
dismisses the complaint under a "no-cause" finding or attempts
to negotiate a settlement between the employer and the
employee.' 6
If attempts at conciliation fail, the EEOC may bring suit
against the employer 7 or it may intervene in a suit brought by
the employee.' s If the EEOC does not file suit within 180 days,
it must issue a "right-to-sue" letter to the complaining employee
upon demand, 19 and the employee may bring suit within 90
days.2 °
Decisions of the EEOC are not binding on courts, which try
charges de novo. 2 ' Investigative files of the EEOC can be
obtained by the opposing parties for purposes of litigation,22 but
the records of reconciliation hearings are sealed and cannot be
used in a later lawsuit.2 3
B. Judicial Relief
Title VII empowers courts to grant injunctive relief, orders
requiring reinstatement to employment, declaratory relief, back
pay, and attorneys' fees.24 Plaintiffs must prove discrimination
under either of two theories of discrimination: disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact. The Supreme Court defined the two
theories in International Bros. of Teamsters v. United States25
as follows:
"Disparate treatment".. . is the most easily understood
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some peo-
ple less favorably than others because of their race, color, reli-
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (f) (1988). Courts have held that the EEOC has
authority to enforce conciliation agreements in the federal courts. EEOC v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); EEOC v.
Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). While investigating a complaint, the EEOC may
issue administrative subpoenas to obtain information. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
54 (1984).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
18. Id. § 2000e-4(g)(6).
19. Id. § 2000e-5(f); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 1 EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 66.6 (1987) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973). If the EEOC
finds "no reasonable cause," the plaintiff may still proceed with her suit. Id. at 799.
22. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1981).
23. 1 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 19, § 83.1(a).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1988).
25. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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gion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from
the mere fact of differences in treatment. Undoubtedly dispa-
rate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involves
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is
not required under a disparate-impact theory.2 6
The rules of proof in each theory are derived from Title VII
and decisions of the United States Supreme Court. These rules
specify what an employee must prove to establish a prima facie
case.27 The rules similarly specify the evidence an employer
may present to rebut the prima facie case, thereby disentitling
the employee to a judgment. 28  Each theory requires a three-
step process of allegation and rebuttal.
1. Rules of Proof for Disparate Treatment
A facially discriminatory employment policy can only be
justified where the classification is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). For example, a nursing home policy that
only female nurses are hired to care for its female patients to
satisfy concerns for personal privacy and modesty has been
found to meet the BFOQ exception.29 Where a policy turns on a
characteristic that is so closely identified with one of the prohib-
ited classifications that the characteristic is synonymous with
protected status, the policy is also unlawful unless justified as a
BFOQ. Employment distinctions based on pregnancy, for
example, constitute unlawful sex discrimination unless a BFOQ
exception applies because only women can become pregnant.30
When a prohibited classification determines an employee's
26. Id. at 334 n.15 (citations omitted).
27. STEPHEN N. SHULMAN & CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 1 1.02[l] (1990).
28. Id.
29. Fesel v. Masonic Home, 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), af/d, 591 F.2d 1334
(3d Cir. 1979); see also Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (N.D. Tex.
1983) (holding that a requirement that helicopter pilots hired to fly into Mecca be
Moslem constitutes a BFOQ based on safety where non-Moslems flying into Mecca are
beheaded if caught).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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treatment, no animus toward the protected class affected by the
policy must be shown to prove disparate treatment.3 '
Where employment discrimination is covert, however, a
plaintiff must prove that the employment practice objected to
was motivated by discriminatory intent or animus to prevail on
a disparate treatment claim.32 Unless the employer's intent to
discriminate is self-evident, it may be very difficult for the
plaintiff to prove the employer's subjective state of mind.33 The
rules of proof for disparate treatment aid plaintiffs by allowing
rebuttable presumptions of intent to be made based on circum-
stantial evidence.34 To make a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, the plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence to
give rise to an inference of discrimination. 35 The burden of pro-
duction is then shifted to the employer, who must offer some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment deci-
sion to avoid summary judgment for the plaintiff.36  If the
employer carries this burden, the plaintiff is given the opportu-
nity to prove that the reason offered by the employer was mere
pretext for discrimination. 37 The ultimate burden of persuasion
31. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991)
(holding that "[wihether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates, but
rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination").
32. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
33. "Even an employer who knowingly discriminates . . . may leave no written
records revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to no one." La
Monntagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984).
34. Former Justice Rehnquist explained the reason for such a presumption:
[W]e are willing to presume ... from our experience that more often than not
people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for
rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's action, it is more likely than not that the employer, who we
generally assume to act with some reason, based his decision on impermissible
considerations such as race.
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
35. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case in a refusal to hire case by showing
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) application and qualification for the job the
plaintiff was seeking; (3) rejection of the applicant; and (4) that the employer continued
to seek applications from persons with qualifications similar to the plaintiffs. Id. at
802. The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to adapt this test to situations
other than claims for failure to hire. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
37. Id. at 804.
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that there was intentional discrimination remains with the
plaintiff at all times.3"
2. Rules of Proof for Disparate Impact
The disparate impact theory was judicially created by the
United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"
and was recently sanctioned by Congress in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.40 To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a
plaintiff must prove that a specified employment practice
caused a harmful effect on a protected class of employees. 4 1 The
burden of both production and proof then shifts to the employer
unless it can establish that the practice was required by busi-
ness necessity.42  If the employer carries this burden, the
employee may suggest alternative, less discriminatory practices
that accomplish the employer's purposes.43 If the employer
refuses to adopt these methods, the plaintiff will prevail.44
The disparate impact theory has been the subject of heated
controversy since its formulation. 4  Employers object that the
burden shifting that occurs under the theory may force employ-
ers to abandon nondiscriminatory employment practices or to
adopt quotas to avoid expensive and time-consuming
litigation.46
38. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
39. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that company policies requiring a high school
diploma and satisfactory aptitude test scores for all but low-level positions at a power
plant discriminated against black job applicants and employees).
40. The relevant portion states as follows: "An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this title only if-(i) a complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991). The term "demonstrates" is defined to mean,
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-2(m).
41. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
42. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (Supp. III 1991); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
45. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 205-41 (1992) (arguing that the disparate impact theory creates
adverse results for both employers and employees and should be abandoned).
46. The wide range of practices that have unequal effects and the danger that an
employer may inadvertently overcompensate and face a reverse discrimination charge
led Justice Blackmun to characterize one employer as walking a "high tightrope without
a net beneath him." United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-10
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
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III. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION LAW TO
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
The common law provides no protection for a worker's
choice of language on the job. Under the employment-at-will
doctrine, an employer is free to establish inequitable workplace
rules if it chooses and to fire an employee without notice for any
reason or no reason.47 While the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments limit the power of government to restrict an employee's
choice of language,48 private employers face no such constitu-
tional limitation. Any restraint on an employer's power to dic-
tate an employee's speech must then originate either in a
contractual obligation or in enacted legislation. Although there
are no explicit terms in Title VII regulating workplace language
rules, the EEOC and some courts have found Title VII
applicable.
This Section discusses the development of the law prohibit-
ing language discrimination and focuses on the question of
whether an English-only rule should be presumed to have an
adverse and disparate impact on a fully bilingual employee.
A. EEOC Application of Title VII to English-Only Rules
The EEOC has regarded language rules with suspicion,
determining that under Title VII certain workplace language
practices often constitute national origin discrimination. 49 The
EEOC has generally analyzed workplace language rules under
a disparate impact theory, finding them allowable only when
justified by business necessity. 50 In its early decisions, the
EEOC allowed employers to justify English-only rules by safety
concerns, but subjected all business necessity defenses offered
by employers to strict scrutiny.5 1 During the final days of the
47. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 1964).
48. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) (holding that the voter-
approved amendment to the Arizona Constitution that required government employees
to speak English violated the 1st Amendment); Asian American Business Group v. City
of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that a city ordinance requiring
any sign displaying non-English characters to devote half of its area to English
characters violated both the 1st and 14th Amendments).
49. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL, supra note 19, § 623.1 (1984) ("Language
requirements or policies may in certain circumstances constitute unlawful employment
discrimination under title VII.").
50. Id. § 623.6.
51. See, e.g., Decision 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861, 1862 (E.E.O.C.
1983) (finding that the English-only rule applied at an oil refinery while employees
performed job duties in laboratory and processing areas and during emergencies was
[Vol. 17:473
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Carter Administration, the EEOC promulgated its "Speak-Eng-
lish-Only' Guidelines, 52 which state that an English-only rule
may be a "burdensome term and condition of employment." 3
The Guidelines state that the EEOC will presume that English-
only rules applied "at all times" violate Title VII, and will allow
English-only rules applied "only at certain times" when justified
by business necessity. 54 This presumption against English-only
rules is based upon the principles that one's "primary language"
is essential to cultural expression, that such rules may disad-
vantage the employee, and that a hostile environment may
result from such rules.5 5 The EEOC has vigorously enforced
these Guidelines. 56
B. English-Only Rules in the Courts
Federal courts hearing Title VII suits have agreed with the
EEOC's assertion that English-only rules can result in national
origin discrimination. Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 5  decided in
justified by business necessity); Decision 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820,
1822 (E.E.O.C. 1980) (finding that the English-only rule adopted by the employer to
stop an employee from making fun of other employees and encouraging them to do less
work, and to satisfy customers who disliked hearing Spanish was not justified by
business necessity).
52. The EEOC has the power to issue procedural regulations to carry out the
provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988). Regulations issued pursuant to
this power are codified in Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The regulations
are not law, but are entitled to considerable deference by the courts unless inconsistent
with congressional intent. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973). The
portion relevant to English-only rules is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1993).
53. Section 1606.7 of the Guidelines on National Discrimination Because of
National Origin provides as follows:
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only
English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of
employment. The primary language of an individual is often an essential
national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak
most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on
the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation, and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission will presume
that such a rule violates title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule
requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where the
employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1993).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. ERNEST C. HADLEY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAw &
PRA rCE ch. VI, C, 5 (1990), available in WESTLAW, FSEEG File.
57. 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973).
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1973, was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985
rather than Title VII.5 In Hernandez, a tavern's rule of seating
Hispanics at separate tables to appease Anglo customers who
objected to hearing conversations conducted in Spanish was
found to constitute unlawful discrimination. 9 Hernandez
helped to establish language as an important aspect of national
origin that might be protected by federal courts.
In Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc.,6° the first
reported case challenging an English-only workplace rule, a
bilingual Hispanic oil field worker was awarded damages and
attorneys' fees for his Title VII disparate impact complaint after
he was fired without warning for speaking three words of Span-
ish.61 Because the employer's conduct in Saucedo was so egre-
gious,62 the court readily determined that the plaintiff had
suffered adverse impact actionable under Title VII. 63 In the
more difficult cases that followed, courts searched for a proper
means of determining for whom and under what circumstances
English-only rules are prohibited under Title VII.
1. Garcia v. Gloor: The Fifth Circuit Requires Case-By-Case
Analysis of Impact
One of the leading cases on English-only rules, Garcia v.
Gloor,64 was decided shortly before publication of the EEOC
Guidelines. In Gloor, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the con-
nection between national origin and language varies among
individuals. The court reasoned that where a language rule is
not motivated by intent to discriminate, the enforcement mech-
anisms of Title VII should only be set in motion where the con-
58. Id. at 754. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), grants all
persons the same right to make and enforce contracts "as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 guarantees that "[all] citizens of the United States shall have the
same right . . . to ... purchase . . . personal property." Id. § 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
prohibits conspiracies to violate a citizen's civil rights. Id. § 1985. Title VII does not
provide a cause of action for customers against sales establishments.
59. Hernandez, 368 F. Supp. at 754-55.
60. 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
61. Id. at 921-22.
62. The plaintiff was not told there was any company rule against speaking
Spanish. Id. at 921. The supervisor who fired the plaintiff assaulted a second Hispanic
employee who verbally defended the plaintiff for speaking Spanish. Id.
63. Id. at 922. The court found it significant that the supervisor was not
reprimanded or discharged for the assault. Id. at 921. Not only did this cut against the
employer's safety justification for the English-only policy, but the firing of the plaintiff
while taking no action against the supervisor was disparate treatment. Id.
64. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
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nection between language and national origin is sufficiently
strong.65 The Gloor court then held that English-only rules do
not cause a discriminatory effect on fully bilingual employees
because for them language is a matter of personal preference
rather than an essential aspect of national origin and compli-
ance with the rule is not a burdensome term or condition of
employment.66
The court examined the text of Title VII and cases inter-
preting the statutes and found that the statutes were directed
at discrimination based on the exercise of a fundamental right
or on immutable characteristics such as race. 67 Title VII was
not directed at employment decisions based on matters of per-
sonal choice such as grooming codes or length of hair.6 Judge
Rubin wrote the following:
The [Equal Employment Opportunity] Act does not prohibit
all arbitrary employment practices. It does not forbid
employers to hire only persons born under a certain sign of
the zodiac or persons having long hair or short hair or no hair
at all. It is directed only at specific impermissible bases of
discrimination-race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.69
This did not mean that employers could impose English-
only rules on all bilingual workers free of any Title VII restric-
tions. The court held that when an employee is not fluent in the
English language, English-only rules could result in impermis-
sible discrimination based on national origin. 0 In addition, the
court held that an employee who could show that the rule cre-
ated a hostile work environment, that she was disciplined for
inadvertently slipping into her native language, or that she was
prohibited from speaking her language of choice during breaks
or outside the workplace, could assert a viable claim of national
origin discrimination under Title VII.7'
65. "Neither the statute nor common understanding equates national origin with
the language one chooses to speak. Language may be used as a covert basis for national
origin discrimination . . . ." Id. at 268.
66. Id. at 270. The trial court made no finding as to the extent to which Garcia's
violation of the language rule weighed in the employer's decision to fire him. Id. at 267-
68. Judge Rubin wrote that "[plerhaps under the evidence he could not, once the omelet
had been cooked, determine which eggs had contributed to it." Id. at 268.
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 272.
71. Id. at 270.
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Because no adverse impact sufficient to make Garcia's
prima facie case was found, the court did not consider whether
business necessity justified the rule. 72  In dicta, the court
rejected the contention of the plaintiff and the EEOC that an
employer must accomplish its business needs in the least
restrictive manner possible, stating that "[ljudges, who have
neither business experience nor the problem of meeting the
employees' payroll, do not have the power to preempt an
employer's business judgment by imposing a solution that
appears less restrictive."7 3
2. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.: The Ninth Circuit Follows
Gloor
In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,7" a bilingual disc jockey
performing on Los Angeles radio station KIIS as Val Valentine
was fired for refusing to follow an English-only format on the
air.75 Jurado periodically spoke Spanish on his program at the
request of his employer's program director, but was told to stop
after a drop in ratings thought to be a result of confusion caused
by the bilingual programming.7 6 Jurado brought a Title VII
action alleging both disparate treatment 77 and disparate impact
against KIIS.71 The United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California granted summary judgment for KIIS
on both claims, and Jurado appealed. 9
The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the summary judgment
against Jurado. 0 The court accepted the employer's explana-
tion that the English-only order was not motivated by racial
animus, finding that the order resulted from "a programming
72. Id. at 267. The court below found that valid business reasons offered by the
employer, rather than discriminatory intent, motivated the decision to terminate
Garcia, thus precluding a finding of disparate treatment. Id. at 266-67. The employer's
asserted business reasons were that (1) English-speaking customers objected to
communications between employees that they could not understand; (2) the employer
wished to encourage fluency in English; and (3) the rule was needed to enable non-
Spanish speaking supervisors to oversee the work of subordinates. Id. at 267.
73. Id. at 271.
74. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 1408.
76. Id. at 1409.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1412.
79. Id. at 1409.
80. Id. at 1413.
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decision motivated by marketing, ratings, and demographic
concerns."81
The court also rejected Jurado's claim that the English-only
order was itself a discriminatory act as used against a bilingual
person such as himself.8 2 Adopting the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in Gloor, the court held that "[an employer can properly
enforce a limited, reasonable, and business-related English-only
rule against an employee who can readily comply with the rule
and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it as 'a matter of
individual preference.' "83 The court found that the rule
imposed by the station had met the Gloor criteria and that the
bilingual plaintiffs violation of the rule was a valid, nondiscrim-
inatory reason for his dismissal.84
3. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court: The Ninth Circuit Finds
English-Only Rules Per Se Discriminatory
Some commentators were not so quick to accept the reason-
ing of Gloor and Jurado. They protested that the deep connec-
tion between language and culture required that a bilingual
employee's language rights be protected. 5 The concerns of
these commentators were shared by the EEOC, which pub-
lished the Speak-English-Only Guidelines in the same year that
Gloor was decided. The Guidelines take the position that rules
denying employees the right to speak their language of national
origin are in all cases a burdensome condition of employment
that is only justified by business necessity.8 6 In 1987, only a
month after Jurado, the critics of Gloor found a sympathetic ear
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when it adopted the
EEOC Guidelines as the proper standard for determining the
validity of English-only workplace rules.
In Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,8 7 the Ninth Circuit explic-
itly declined to follow Gloor's holding that English-only rules
cause no disparate or adverse impact for a bilingual employee.88
81. Id. at 1410.
82. Id. at 1411.
83. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to
Language, 23 HOUSTON L. REV. 885, 898-900 (1986); Comment, Language
Discrimination Under Title VII: The Silent Right of National Origin Discrimination, 15
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 667, 676 (1982).
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1993).
87. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and cert. granted, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
88. Id. at 1040-41.
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Responding to the employer's contention that the plaintiff suf-
fered no disparate or adverse impact from a limited English-
only rule because she was fully bilingual, Judge Reinhardt
wrote that "we do not think English-only rules can be so easily
immunized from judicial scrutiny."8 9  The Gutierrez court
instead held that English-only rules are per se discriminatory
unless justified by business necessity, regardless of the English
fluency of the employees affected by the rules.90 Although the
court purported to leave Jurado undisturbed, 9' the Gutierrez
court clearly reversed the holding in Jurado.9 2 The deferential
attitude toward the decisions of employers exhibited in Jurado
was thus replaced with a decidedly hostile one.
In Gutierrez, a bilingual clerk employed by the Southeast
Judicial District of the Los Angeles Municipal Court challenged
a rule prohibiting Spanish except in conversations with the
public.93 The municipal court judges instituted the rule in
response to complaints by African American and Anglo clerks
that they were being ridiculed in Spanish by the plaintiff.94 A
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit found that Gutierrez had
made her prima facie case of disparate impact.9 Citing several
law review articles written by commentators advocating lan-
guage rights, the court held that "English-only rules generally
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1040.
91. The Gutierrez court distinguished the two decisions as follows:
We note that in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.... we cited Garcia v. Gloor in
support of our decision that a radio station's English-only rule, with which its
disk-jockey employee could readily comply, did not have an adverse impact on
that employee. However, the issues involved in Jurado were far different from
the ones presently before us. The Jurado rule was considerably more restricted
than and bore little or no resemblance, either in purpose or effect, to the edict
of the municipal court judges.
Id. at 838 (citation omitted).
92. Judge Kozinski protested that "[tihe panel . . . buries a prior opinion of this
circuit whose holding is directly contrary. Jurado v. Eleven Fifty Corp." Gutierrez v.
Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1188 (1988) (denying rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Gutierrez II]. "In hamhanded fashion, the
Gutierrez panel throws Jurado's rationale out the window and substitutes its own." Id.
at 1190.
93. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036. The plaintiff also brought non-Title VII claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3), which are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
94. Several of the 27 full time court clerks, including Anglos, African Americans,
and even some Hispanics complained that a handful of Hispanic clerks were
increasingly using Spanish to cloak their conversations, and that they occasionally
made it clear that they were discussing coworkers. Gutierrez 11, 861 F.2d at 1191
(citations omitted).
95. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040.
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.
have an adverse impact on protected groups and ... should be
closely scrutinized."9 6 The court found that "[tihe EEOC guide-
lines, by requiring that a business necessity be shown before a
limited English-only rule may be enforced, properly balance the
individual's interest in speaking his primary language and any
possible need of the employer to ensure that in particular cir-
cumstances only English shall be spoken."97 The court summa-
rily rejected five business justifications offered by the municipal
court and affirmed the trial court's injunction barring the
municipal court from enforcing the English-only rule.9"
The Gutierrez panel took great pains to distinguish its deci-
sion from the contrary result reached in Jurado just one month
earlier. The Gutierrez opinion characterized Jurado as a deci-
sion in which the speech of the employee/plaintiff was the prod-
uct that the employer was offering to the public.99 Unlike the
speech in Jurado, the speech in Gutierrez concerned intra-
employee communication that had no direct effect on the opera-
tion of the court.'0 0 Furthermore, the Guiterrez court suggested
that even if the English-only rule in Jurado had presented a
prima facie case of disparate impact, the rule was justified by
business necessity. 10 1
After the decision, the Ninth Circuit denied the municipal
court's petition for a rehearing en banc.10 2 In a spirited dissent,
Judge Kozinski complained that the Gutierrez panel had
engaged in "creative revisionism" by seeking to distinguish
Jurado on "fanciful... insubstantial" grounds.1 0 3 The opinion,
Judge Kozinski asserted, merited en banc reconsideration
because it had the result of "hamstringing employers who would
assuage racial and ethnic tensions created by the use of a sec-
ond language in the workplace .... bring[ing] about many of the
conditions the Civil Rights Act was meant to eliminate."'0 4
Judge Kozinski's dissent quoted a newspaper account of a
black employee who had complained to the municipal court
judges about the use of Spanish.0 5 The clerk recalled her
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1045.
99. Id. at 1041.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Gutierrez H, 861 F.2d at 1187.
103. Id. at 1191.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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humiliation when she tripped or dropped something and a
group of bilingual clerks suddenly started bantering excitedly in
Spanish while laughing at her.10 6 Judge Kozinski also pointed
to a letter in the record, signed by eight of the twenty-seven full
time clerks who supported the English-only rule:
If the [Municipal Court] Judge's ruling is overturned it
will have an adverse effect. Spanish is not essential when
relating to fellow employees, and in many cases is used to
undermine supervision and to talk about fellow employees.
Feelings are hurt and tension builds. This is when employee
camaraderie and morale begin to deteriorate. 10 7
One Hispanic clerk remarked that when she heard about the
English-only rule her "interpretation of it was, 'be more courte-
ous. Do not abuse your Spanish-speaking or bilingual abilities.'
I completely support the rule."'
Summarizing his dissent, Judge Kozinski wrote the
following:
[I]t is highly unwise to prohibit all employers everywhere
from adopting [an English-only] rule, even when they have
reason to believe that language is being used to exclude and
isolate employees of a particular race or ethnic group. Our
society is too complex, and the factual permutations far too
diverse, to permit the imposition of a universal rule by judi-
cial fiat.10 9
4. The State of the Law After Gutierrez
The Gutierrez decision created a split between the circuits
over the requirements for a prima facie case of language dis-
crimination. The Ninth Circuit presumed that English-only
rules always have adverse impact, while the Fifth Circuit tied
the presence of adverse impact to the fluency of the plaintiffs
English. The Supreme Court, however, vacated Gutierrez as
moot without explanation, 110 possibly because the plaintiff was
no longer employed at the municipal court."' Gutierrez was
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1192.
108. Id. (quoting Jill Stewart, Huntington Park Judges "Incredulous; English-Only
Rule Still Creating Uproar, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1985, at 9).
109. Id. at 1193.
110. 49 U.S. 1016 (1989).
111. The municipal court judges' brief to the Supreme Court claimed that no
English-only rule had been put into effect, and that, even if it had, it would not apply to
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applauded by language rights advocates, 112 who urged adoption
of the EEOC Guidelines by future courts, and the decision con-
tinued to serve as persuasive authority. 1i3
IV. GARCIA V. SPUN STEAK: PLAINTIFFS MUST PRovE THAT
IMPACT Is ADVERSE
In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 1 14 the Ninth Circuit defined
the evidentiary burden a Title VII plaintiff must meet to estab-
the plaintiff because she was no longer an employee of the court. BILL PATT, LANGUAGE
ON THE JOB 69 (1993).
112. Id. at 124; Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent"
Employers: Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory
Under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV. 387, 424 (1989); Aileen Maria Ugalda, Comment, "No
Se Habla Espanol": English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 44 U. MIMvI L. REV. 1209,
1225 (1990).
113. Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 307 (D.P.R. 1992) (holding that a
classification on the basis of language can be equivalent to a classification by national
origin); Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (finding "a person's primary language is a part of and flows from his/
her national origin").
After the Gutierrez decision was vacated by the Supreme Court, district courts in
the Ninth Circuit heard two additional cases challenging workplace language
requirements. In Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, 775 F. Supp.
338 (C.D. Cal. 1991), a Filipina American nurse claimed that the banning of Tagalog on
her shift resulted in discrimination based on both disparate impact and disparate
treatment. Id. at 343-44. The court dismissed the disparate treatment claim for lack of
evidence that the hospital's restriction was based on racial animus. Id. at 344.
The court also rejected the disparate impact claim, reasoning that the no-Tagalog
policy was not an English-only rule because Spanish was allowed on the shift during the
limited period of time that the policy had been effect. Id. at 342, 345. Rather, the court
wrote, the policy was "at most, a shift-specific directive tailored to respond to certain
conflicts among identified staff nurses." Id. at 342. The court further found that the no-
Tagalog policy was not a facially neutral employment practice triggering disparate
impact analysis because it was obviously directed only at the Filipina nurses and
therefore was expressly nonneutral. Id. at 345. The court, however, held that the
hospital had violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) by retaliating against Dimaranan for her
opposition to the language policy. Id. at 345-47.
In Cota v. Tucson Police Dept., 783 F. Supp. 458 (D. Ariz. 1992), the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona rejected claims of both disparate impact and
disparate treatment by Hispanic police officers forced to speak Spanish on the job
without additional compensation under a police department rule that applied to all
officers. Id. at 460-62. The court found that statistical evidence presented by the
Hispanic officers showing that Hispanic officers were called upon to speak Spanish
more than non-Hispanic officers failed to infer intent and thus was insufficient to make
a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Id. at 468. The disparate impact claim failed
when the court found that the effect on the Hispanic plaintiffs was nondiscriminatory
and nonadverse. Id. at 473. "The legal meaning of the term 'disparate impact' cannot
be stretched to include every type of statistically significant impact." Id. at 474 (quoting
Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 550 (9th Cir.
1982)).
114. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
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lish a prima facie case of disparate impact where employment
practices adversely affect conditions of employment. The
Guiterrez presumption that English-only rules are per se dis-
criminatory was explicitly rejected in favor of a standard requir-
ing proof of adverse impact for English-only rules as well as for
other allegedly discriminatory practices. 115
Spun Steak, Co., a corporation that produces meat prod-
ucts, is located in South San Francisco. At the time of the suit,
it employed mostly bilingual Hispanics as well as two employ-
ees who spoke only Spanish. 116 Responding to complaints that
two bilingual Hispanics had repeatedly harassed and insulted
an African American and a Chinese American worker with
derogatory and racist comments, Spun Steak passed an Eng-
lish-only rule for the alleged purpose of promoting worker
harmony. 117
The two employees who had allegedly harassed others,
Garcia and Buitrago, received written warning letters when
they continued to speak Spanish in violation of the rule."'
When Spun Steak refused the union's demand to rescind the
rule, the union local, Garcia, and Buitrago filed discrimination
charges with the EEOC." 9 The EEOC investigated and deter-
mined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Spun
Steak had violated Title VII. 120 Subsequently, Garcia, Bui-
trago, and the union local brought suit against Spun Steak on
behalf of all Spanish-speaking employees of Spun Steak. 2 ' The
EEOC filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs.' 22
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of California issued a preliminary injunction striking Spun
Steak's English-only rule. 23 On appeal by Spun Steak, the
plaintiffs presented three arguments in support of the district
court's decision. Relying on the reasoning of Gutierrez, the
115. Id. at 1487 n.1.
116. Id. at 1483.
117. Id. The rule also had purported secondary purposes: (1) to eliminate
distraction to employees operating dangerous equipment, and (2) to enhance product
quality by enabling the USDA inspector to better understand concerns about products.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1483-84.
121. Id. at 1484.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1480.
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plaintiffs based their complaint on the EEOC Guidelines. 12 4
The plaintiffs claimed that the English-only rule caused an
adverse impact by (1) denying them the ability to express their
cultural heritage on the job; (2) denying them a privilege of
employment enjoyed by monolingual speakers of English; and
(3) creating an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimi-
dation. 125 Judge O'Scannlain, who had previously joined Judge
Kozinski in a strong dissent to the Ninth Circuit's decision
declining to rehear Gutierrez,'26 wrote for the majority of the
Spun Steak court.
The Spun Steak court first examined whether the disparate
impact theory was applicable, when the plaintiffs had neither
been denied jobs or promotions, nor suffered other objectively
manifest harm from the English-only rule.'2 7 The court inter-
preted the Spanish-speaking plaintiffs' complaint to allege dis-
crimination as to "conditions of employment" prohibited under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) rather than discrimination affecting"employment opportunities" prohibited under § 2000e-
2(a)(2).' 28 Judge O'Scannlain noted that the Supreme Court
had not yet decided whether the disparate impact theory may
be applied to employment practices affecting conditions of
employment under § 2000e-2(a)(1). 129 However, in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson,'3 ° the Supreme Court applied a disparate
treatment analysis to employment practices affecting conditions
of employment. 13' Following the Supreme Court's instruction
that the language of § 2000e-2(a)(1) be interpreted "broadly,"
the Spun Steak court found that intent to discriminate was not
an essential element of a claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), and that
a disparate impact charge alleging adverse effect on conditions
of employment could be maintained.'3 2
While acknowledging that the subjective effects of an
employment practice affecting conditions of employment might
be more difficult to prove than the quantifiable effects on which
124. Id. at 1487 n.1.
125. Id. at 1480-87.
126. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
127. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977)).
130. 477 U.S. 57 (1985).
131. Id. at 64.
132. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485-86.
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disparate impact is usually based, the court held that actual
proof of disparate impact is required nonetheless. 133
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact from a
practice affecting terms and conditions of employment, an
employee may not "merely assert that the rule has harmed
members of the group to which he or she belongs."' 34 Instead,
the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the existence of adverse effects of the rule;
(2) that the rule adversely impacts terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment of the protected class;
(3) that the adverse effects are significant;
(4) that the employee population in general is not affected
by the rule to the same degree. 35
The court justified this four-part analysis by asserting that
Title VII "is not meant to protect against rules that merely
inconvenience some employees, even if the inconvenience falls
regularly on a protected class. Title VII protects against only
those policies that have a significant effect."' 36 This more
exacting formulation enabled the court to distinguish between
the actionable claim of non-English speaking employees and the
nonactionable claim of the bilingual employees.
Having established the parameters of the substantive law,
the court turned its attention to the plaintiffs' individual
claims. The court first considered the cultural heritage
claim.' 37 While recognizing the importance of language as a
link to ethnic culture and identity, the court held that Title VII
does not confer substantive privileges such as a right to cultural
expression on the job. "[A]n employee must often sacrifice indi-
vidual self-expression during working hours. Just as a private
employer is not required to allow other types of self-expression,
there is nothing in Title VII that requires an employer to allow
employees to express their cultural identity." 3 ' Because a
right to cultural expression could not be considered a protected
privilege of employment, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that a Title VII claim could be based upon a policy that
133. Id. at 1486.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1488.
137. Id. at 1487.
138. Id.
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denied workers the ability to express their cultural heritage on
the job.
The court next turned to the plaintiffs' assertion that the
English-only rule disparately impacted Spanish-speaking
employees by denying them the privilege of conversing in their
chosen language. The court rejected this claim on the reasoning
that the employer had granted its employees merely the privi-
lege of conversing on the job, rather than a broader privilege of
conversing on the job in the language of the employee's
choice.' 3 9 Citing Garcia and Jurado, the court found that for a
fully bilingual employee, language was no more than a matter
of individual preference.' 4 ° "The bilingual employee can readily
comply with the English-only rule and still enjoy the privilege of
speaking on the job."' 4 ' Because the bilingual employee could
readily converse in English on the job, the court held that the
rule had no significant impact upon the employee.' 42
The bilingual plaintiffs also argued that compliance with
the English-only rule would be difficult because they sometimes
inadvertently used Spanish words and phrases. This argument
failed as the court found that the inconvenience of guarding
against slips of the tongue did not impose a significant burden
on bilingual employees, and there was no evidence presented
that Spun Steak actually punished employees for such occa-
sional speaking of Spanish.14 3
Although the plaintiffs' arguments failed, the court did note
that non-English speaking employees might still present a via-
ble claim of discrimination under Title VII. 4 4 When an
employee's English skill is so limited that the employee is effec-
tively denied the privilege of conversing on the job, the English-
only rule may deny them "the privilege of speaking on the
job.,,4
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that
the English-only rule created a hostile work environment that
amounted to a condition of employment giving rise to a violation
of Title VII.' 46 Although the Supreme Court explicitly approved
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1488.
143. Id. at 1487-88.
144. Id. at 1488.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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the hostile environment theory only in cases of intentional dis-
crimination, the Spun Steak court did consider the plaintiffs'
disparate impact claims based on the theory.147 The court
adopted the standard of proof for a hostile work environment
from Vinson, a sexual harassment case in which the Supreme
Court held that disparate treatment may be found where a hos-
tile environment is created by pervasive discriminatory prac-
tices.' 4 ' The Ninth Circuit held that to determine whether
English-only rules or the manner in which they are enforced
have such a pronounced effect as to amount to a hostile work
environment, courts must look to the "totality of the circum-
stances in the particular factual context in which the claim
arises.'"149
Applying this standard, the court found the plaintiffs' "con-
clusory statements" that the English-only rule contributed to a
hostile environment were insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact.' 10 The court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to grant summary judgment for Spun
Steak as to claims by fully bilingual employees and to consider
the merits of the claims of non-English speaking employees.' 5 '
The court explained its rejection of the EEOC Guidelines,
declaring that while the Supreme Court has approved the
Guidelines as a "body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,"'5 2
the Guidelines are not binding on a court and should not be fol-
lowed when there are "compelling indications that [its construc-
tion of a statute] is wrong."' 53 The Spun Steak panel reasoned
that "Congress intended that a balance be struck in preventing
discrimination and preserving the independence of the
employer."1 54 The court thus concluded that the Guidelines
contravene congressional intent by shifting the burden of proof
to the employer on a presumption that English-only rules
always have disparate impact. 155
147. Id. at 1488-89.
148. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 47 (1986).
149. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1490.
152. Id. at 1489 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65).
153. Id. (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1986)).
154. Id. at 1490.
155. Id.
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V. THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE WORKPLACE
Spun Steak firmly establishes that English-only rules can
disparately impact protected classes in violation of Title VII.
After Spun Steak, however, the burden of proof is squarely on
plaintiffs to show that the impact of the English-only rule
causes them more than mere discomfort or loss of an opportu-
nity for cultural expression.
The Spun Steak decision disappointed those who hoped
that the Ninth Circuit would apply the reasoning of Gutierrez
and reinstate the EEOC Guidelines as the standard for deciding
claims based on English-only workplace rules. The Ninth Cir-
cuit explicitly rejected the Guidelines' requirement that employ-
ers show business necessity for English-only rules in all
circumstances. Unlike the Gutierrez court, which adopted the
EEOC Guidelines without reservation, the Spun Steak court
determined that the burden shifting implied by the Guidelines
was inappropriate in the context of litigation. A close analysis
of the Spun Steak decision, however, reveals that Spun Steak
has, in fact, resurrected much of Gutierrez.
A. Spun Steak Partially Affirms the Guidelines
Despite its rejection of the EEOC Guidelines, the Spun
Steak court approved three of the four principles that form the
basis of the regulations. The Spun Steak court rejected entirely
the first principle set forth in the Guidelines, which provides
that an employee may not be prohibited from speaking her pri-
mary language on the job because for her it is an "essential
national origin characteristic."15
The second principle advanced in the Guidelines, that an
English-only rule applied to a person with limited English skills
"disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities," 157
alludes to the portion of Title VII text usually associated with a
charge of discrimination based upon the disparate treatment
theory. The disadvantage that an employee suffers from an
English-only rule, however, does not depend on discriminatory
intent for its force. The language of the Guidelines omits refer-
ence to intent, thus suggesting that disparate impact analysis
may be applied to English-only rules. The Spun Steak court
adopted this principle of the Guidelines when it held that dispa-
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1993).
157. Id.
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rate impact might be proved where an English-only rule denied
employees with limited English skills the privilege of convers-
ing on the job.
The hostile environment theory set forth in the Guidelines
was also accepted by the Spun Steak court, and was applied to
both cases of disparate impact and cases of disparate treatment.
The court, however, added the requirement that the plaintiffs
show that the English-only rule has such a pronounced effect
that a hostile environment results.
The Spun Steak court also sanctioned the final principle of
the Guidelines, that arbitrary or discriminatory application of
an English-only rule could constitute a violation of Title VII. 158
The court's opinion stated that "we can envision a case in which
such rules are enforced in such a draconian manner that the
enforcement itself amounts to harassment."15 9
Most importantly, the court rejected the Guidelines' asser-
tion that the mere presence of an English-only rule presump-
tively establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination. This portion of the Guidelines directly contra-
dicts the Supreme Court's command, and therefore was prop-
erly rejected by the Spun Speak court. The Supreme Court has
unambiguously declared that "[t]o establish a prima facie case
of [disparate impact] discrimination, a plaintiff must show that
the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly dis-
criminatory impact."160 Although the Guidelines provide useful
assistance to EEOC employees attempting to reconcile employ-
ment disputes in informal and nonbinding procedures, the rule
is inappropriate in the context of litigation where the allocation
of the burden of proof is critical.
The Spun Steak court correctly halted the unwarranted
expansion of Title VII beyond the scope of its intended purpose
of eliminating purposeful discrimination in hiring and promo-
tion. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he language of
Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination.
The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment."16 It is doubtful, however, that Congress
intended employers to be forced to justify in court each practice
158. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
159. Id.
160. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
161. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (citations omitted).
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causing either a small disparity in working conditions among
different groups or minor social discomforts on the job.
An employer contesting a discrimination charge faces sig-
nificant expense as well as damage to reputation and employee
morale. Without a limitation on the reach of employee charges
of discrimination, employers will be under constant and intensi-
fied attacks from employees, unions, and other groups who seek
to include less culpable forms of discriminatory behavior under
the protections of Title VII.' 6 2
An employer facing a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination must meet both the burdens of production and
persuasion to establish a defense of business necessity. 6 ' The
defense of business necessity may be difficult to prove. Evi-
dence is difficult to obtain when employees are unavailable or
unwilling to testify against fellow employees. A small employer
may be limited in its ability to pay high fees to expert witnesses,
while employees may have access to other resources provided by
unions and other organizations. The EEOC Guidelines placed a
heavy burden on all employers to justify English-only rules by
business necessity, regardless of their limited application or the
existence of compelling reasons for the rules. This was an
excessive burden for the employer, particularly when the link
between language and national origin varies so greatly between
individuals that any generalization is of little value.
An employer is under an ethical and legal duty to protect
employees from racial and sexual harassment, 64 whether or
not the harassment is conducted in English, and whether or not
the person conducting the harassment is a member of a pro-
tected class.1 65 Employers are increasingly required to manage
162. See, e.g., Giaimo & Vreeburg v. Smith, 599 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 1993).
There, a white lawyer failed in a charge that black rap artist LL Cool J discriminated
unlawfully against him by firing him in favor of a black attorney. Id. at 841. While the
case was not brought under Title VII, it illustrates an attempt to expand civil rights
law.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1XA), 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III 1991).
164. Volume two of the EEOC Compliance Manual § 615.7 provides as follows:
The EEOC has stated that it has long recognized that ... under Title VII, an
employer has an affirmative duty to maintain a working environment free from
. . . harrassment, intimidation, or insult based on race, color, religion, or
national origin and that the duty encompasses a requirement to take positive
action where necessary to eliminate such practices or remedy their effects. The
Commission's position ... has been upheld by the courts.
2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL, supra note 19, § 615.7 (1981) (citations omitted).
165. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
recently ordered trial in a suit by an English-speaking African American nurse who
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multiple protected classes in the same workplace, 16 6 and they
must be able to balance the interests of these groups as is
required by the circumstances without undue risk of litigation.
If Title VII were meant to provide absolute protection for
cultural expression on the job, employees would logically be able
to bring actions against employers who deny them the right to
wear the clothing of their national origin to work. If Title VII
were meant to ensure that each class of employees enjoys
exactly the same comfort level in the workplace, we might see
suits seeking injunctions to compel the company cafeteria to tai-
lor its menu in proportion to the ethnic composition of the work
force, or to force employers to provide paid holidays coinciding
with traditional holidays in each employee's country of origin.
While these examples seem patently absurd, they demonstrate
that the power of the courts to intervene for the promotion of
equal opportunity must be subject to some limitation. Congress
could not have intended all disputes having racial, religious,
gender, or national origin components to be settled through
litigation.
Rather, Title VII was designed by Congress to settle most
disputes through the noncoercive means of investigation and
mediation by EEOC employees skilled and experienced in
resolving disputes between employees and employers. The
coercive power of the courts is reserved only for situations that
place a harsh burden on protected employees when that burden
is not necessitated by the general operation of the business.
In light of recent changes in Title VII that increase the pen-
alties for employers while limiting their defenses,16 7 it is critical
that courts establish limits on the range of circumstances in
which employees may force their employers into court. By set-
ting reasonable requirements for plaintiffs seeking to make a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the Ninth
alleged that a hospital's failure to institute an English-only rule constitutes
discrimination against English-speaking employees. McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F. Supp.
1079, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The plaintiff complained that her Filipino supervisors used
the Tagalog language as a "discriminatory weapon" against her and other non-Filipinos.
Id.
166. Lynn Martin, in remarks before the Commonwealth Club of California,
asserted that "[w]e are in the midst of a revolution in our economy.... Over the past 20
years, an unprecedented number of women, minorities, and immigrants have been
incorporated into the work force." Former U.S. Labor Secretary and Deloitte & Touche
Advisor Speaks on American Work Force Challenges, Business Wire, November 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File.
167. See infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
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Circuit in Spun Steak has ensured that Title VII's purpose of
protecting employees from discrimination in working conditions
as well as in employment opportunities will be achieved without
sacrificing the autonomy of employers.
B. Employer Defenses to Disparate Impact After Spun Steak
The Spun Steak decision did not directly address the issue
of what is needed to show business necessity for English-only
rules as a rebuttal to a prima facie case of disparate impact dis-
crimination, leaving this issue as yet undecided in any of the
circuits. 168  To prevail on a business necessity defense, the
Ninth Circuit has previously required that "[tihe practice must
be essential, [and] the purpose compelling."1 69 This extremely
demanding standard is difficult to meet. Where disparate
impact is on a privilege of employment rather than on employ-
ment opportunities, the lesser although significant degree of
harm incurred by the employee should be balanced by a lesser
need on the part of the employer to show business necessity for
the disparate condition. The degree of necessity for the Eng-
lish-only rule should be balanced against the burden imposed.
An absolute standard that the rule be essential is not appropri-
ate in such a situation. Of course, where a hostile work envi-
ronment results from an English-only rule, the harm may be
severe and the rule could be struck down if not essential. A
more appropriate general standard may be found in a 1989 lan-
guage discrimination case, Fragante v. City & County of Hono-
lulu,' 70 where the Ninth Circuit stated that "an adverse
employment decision may be predicated on an individual's
accent when-but only when-it interferes materially with job
performance."' 7 ' Although Fragante was brought under the
disparate treatment theory, under which a business reason for
168. The Fifth Circuit in Gloor approved the trial court's finding that business
justifications given by the employer were sufficient to rebut an inference of intentional
discrimination, but did not apply a business necessity analysis after finding no
disparate impact on the plaintiff. Nor was the business necessity issue reached by the
Ninth Circuit in Jurado, where the court similarly held that the plaintiff failed to make
his prima facie case of disparate impact. The Spun Steak court stated that Gutierrez, in
which the Ninth Circuit had applied extremely strict scrutiny to business justifications
for an English-only rule, "has no precedential authority." Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998
F.2d 1480, 1487 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993).
169. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing
Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981)).
170. 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 596.
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a decision need only be sufficient to rebut an allegation that it is
mere pretext for discrimination, the material interference stan-
dard stated there could be applied to test the sufficiency of a
business necessity defense in a disparate impact challenge to an
English-only rule. 172 Where an employer institutes an English-
only rule to prevent harassment, for example, the employer
should be able to establish a business necessity defense by a
showing that the harassment was severe enough to materially
interfere with the job performance of the victims or that the
harassment was in violation of Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Spun Steak decision provides much-needed guidance
for Ninth Circuit employers with multilingual work forces,
enabling employers to better formulate policies that conform to
Title VII requirements. This decision also provides a precise
legal standard for application by district courts hearing Title
VII disparate impact cases, especially those related to work-
place language rules. The Spun Steak decision affects language
discrimination law with respect to English-only rules in three
ways. First, workers will not be able challenge English-only
rules as unlawful restrictions on the right to cultural expres-
sion. Second, fluently bilingual employees will be able to bring
successful disparate impact suits challenging English-only
rules only in exceptional circumstances. Finally, employees
may successfully bring actions under a hostile environment the-
ory when an English-only rule produces a pronounced discrimi-
natory effect, or where an English-only rule is applied in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
In addition to its effect on language discrimination law, the
Spun Steak decision establishes a cause of action for employees
suffering a hostile work environment as a result of other kinds
of workplace policies that are not motivated by intent to dis-
criminate but that have an adverse impact on a protected class
of employees.
While the Spun Steak decision will likely deter some dispa-
rate impact suits over English-only rules, other recent develop-
ments enhance the position of bilingual employees. The Civil
172. See SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 27, T 4.03[2][a] (citing Gutierrez and
Saucedo for the proposition that courts have rejected English-only rules when the
speaking of a language other than English does not impede the operations of the
business).
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Rights Act of 1991 was enacted specifically to aid employment
discrimination plaintiffs, 7 ' and accomplishes its purpose
through a series of amendments to Title VII. First, employers
deferiding disparate impact charges by asserting the business
necessity defense will no longer be able to prevail merely by
asserting the lenient "business justification" defense allowed in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.17 1 Second, the amendments
provide for compensatory and punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination. 1 75 Third, jury trials are made avail-
able for intentional discrimination cases. 176 Fourth, expert wit-
ness fees may be awarded to the prevailing party. 1 7 Finally,
the mixed motive defense to intentional discrimination is elimi-
173. Section 3 of the Act states that its purposes include the following:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and
unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove v. Atonio;
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII ... ; and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (citations
omitted).
174. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court held that a
challenged business practice is justified if it merely "serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id. at 659. The Supreme Court went on
to say that "there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster: this degree of scrutiny
would be almost impossible for most employers to meet." Id. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 overrules Wards Cove in a somewhat indirect manner. Section 105(b) of the Act
provides that the interpretive memorandum appearing in Volume 137 of the
Congressional Record, 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), is to be relied
upon as legislative history in construing provisions relating to Wards Cove. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075. This interpretive
memorandum states that "[tihe terms 'business necessity' and 'job relatedness' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Court in Griggs ... and in other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove." 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 1991).
175. Section 102(a)(1) of the Act provides compensatory and punitive damages for
intentional discrimination only. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1II 1991). These damages are
capped by § 102(b)(3) at levels rising from $50,000 for employers with 15 to 100
employees up to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. Id.
§ 1981a(b)(3).
176. Section 102(c) of the Act provides for a jury trial on demand in cases of
intentional discrimination where compensatory or punitive damages are sought. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991). The jury is not to be informed of the damage caps
in § 102(c)(2). Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. III 1991).
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nated, and employers are now liable for discrimination when-
ever a discriminatory purpose contributed to an employment
practice, even though other factors may also have motivated the
practice. 178
Employees challenging English-only rules may be expected
to increasingly allege disparate treatment, producing evidence
to persuade a jury that English-only rules were motivated by
prejudice rather than business purpose. The availability of con-
sequential and punitive damages in disparate treatment cases
will encourage plaintiffs to bring charges of intentional discrim-
ination, while the availability of expert witness fees may
encourage plaintiffs as well.
Federal employment law will only meet its ultimate goal of
bringing about voluntary employer compliance 179 when the
needs of employers are properly balanced with the needs of
employees to be protected from discrimination that significantly
hinders their employment opportunities or subjects them to a
discriminatory work environment. The Spun Steak decision
will not only encourage compliance with federal discrimination
law, but it will also allow employers more freedom to enact
workplace rules that balance the ever-changing dynamics of an
increasingly multicultural work force. The Ninth Circuit has
presented a fair and workable solution to determine when Eng-
lish-only rules and other employment practices affecting work-
ing conditions can be challenged in court under Title VII.
178. Section 107(a) of the Act states that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
need only be a motivating factor for an employment practice to establish discrimination,
"even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp.
III 1991). This section overrules Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
There, the Court had established a mixed-motive defense by allowing the employer to
prevail by showing that it would have made the same decision even if sex had not been
considered. Id. at 244-45.
179. See EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1984). The court
there noted the following:
Encouraging voluntary compliance with Title VII is among the [Equal
Employment Opportunity] Commission's most essential functions. Indeed
when the Commission was created in 1964, it had the power only to investigate
complaints and negotiate voluntary compliance. Not until Congress amended
the Act in 1972 did it give the Commission authority to seek federal court
enforcement of Title VII . . . . [T]he Supreme Court [has] stated that
"[c]ooperation and compliance were selected as the preferred means for
achieving this goal [of assuring equality of economic opportunity]."
Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted). The court further noted in discussing predetermina-
tion settlement agreements that such a settlement "saves resources that might other-
wise be consumed in litigation and furthers the statutory goal of voluntary compliance."
Id. at 305.
